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ABSTRACT
Simply Reproducing Reality— 
Brecht, Benjamin, and  
Renger-Patzsch on Photography
Carl Gelderloos
This article reads Albert Renger-Patzsch’s photographic theory and practice in 
the context of Benjamin’s and Brecht’s dismissals of his work in order to recover 
the paradoxical interplay between documentation and perceptual training central 
to debates about photography as a specifically modern medium during the 1920s. 
I argue that, rather than evincing a naïve faith in verisimilitude, Renger-Patzsch 
mobilized ideas of visual analogy, formal play, and embodied vision to foreground 
the camera’s potential for disrupting perceptual habits. Returning to this moment 
of Weimar photographic theory can help recover deeper aesthetic tensions among 
formal, documentary, and critical demands made of the medium.
“The situation thus becomes so complicated that a simple ‘reproduction of reality’ 
is now less than ever able to say anything about reality. A photograph of the Krupp 
works or the AEG shows almost nothing about these institutions.”1
“Only slowly does the much more radical view begin to take hold—that the task of 
reforming our entire aesthetic perspectives from the ground up falls to this new 
beauty of technology. . . . Works of technology should not conform to an existing 
aesthetic, but rather, it is through them that our concept of beauty takes on a 
fundamentally altered aspect.”2
“But now follow the path of photography further. What do you see? It becomes 
ever more nuancé, ever more modern; and the result is that it can no longer 
record a tenement block or a refuse heap without transfiguring it. Needless to say, 
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photography is unable to convey anything about a power station or a cable factory 
other than, ‘What a beautiful world!’”3
“With the attempt to represent an idea, photography transgresses the borders 
marked out for it.”4
The distance between these positions marks out the space of a central debate on pho-
tographic representation during the Weimar Republic. The question of photography’s 
capacity to access reality was a keynote of the discourse on the photographic medium 
in the Weimar Republic. Photography, though nearly a century old by this time, was 
central to the aesthetic discourse of the 1920s. On the one hand, its mechanical 
reproduction of visual impressions made it foundational for discussions of the new 
medium of film, especially before the advent of sound film, and on the other, its 
supposed documentary veracity prompted reexaminations of older media such as 
literature and painting.5 Because the discussion of photography involved a reappraisal 
of a medium that was coded as particularly technological and because discussions 
of photography tended never to remain discussions simply of photography, but also 
spilled over, particularly under the sign of Neue Sachlichkeit, into other media such 
as film, literature, and theater, not to mention other conceptual realms entirely, a 
closer look at a key moment of this debate is a prerequisite to understanding how 
discourses of technology, media, and aesthetics were constantly reconfiguring and 
reconstituting each other during the period.6 
With this paper I hope to reexamine the indirect debate on photographic represen-
tation staged by Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin, and Albert Renger-Patzsch. This will 
involve a good deal of reconstruction and, to be fair, a bit of construction as well, since 
it was not actually a debate in any meaningful sense of the word. While Benjamin and 
Brecht do mention Renger-Patzsch explicitly, they address the photographer’s work 
only obliquely and dismissively; it is fair to say that “Renger-Patzsch” or Die Welt ist 
schön (The World is Beautiful)—the title of his best-known photobook—came to stand 
in as a synecdoche for the photography of Neue Sachlichkeit more generally, and even 
for broader tendencies or possibilities of photography at large. Renger-Patzsch for his 
part never addresses either Benjamin or Brecht, and I have been unable to determine 
whether he was even familiar with their criticisms. His own writings on photography 
are largely of a practical nature and consist far more of tips for amateurs and pro-
fessionals on composition, equipment, technique, filters, chemicals, proper tripod 
usage, how best to illuminate succulents, etc., than the sort of media-theoretical and 
aesthetic questions Benjamin and Brecht were addressing. But it may be the very fact 
that the two camps were talking completely past one another that makes this debate 
so interesting, and it is worth asking what it might mean that two of the most signifi-
cant media theorists of the Weimar Republic had so little common discursive ground 
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with its most prominent photographer and their main target. In effect, Benjamin and 
Brecht were rejecting, in their various critiques of Renger-Patzsch, the claims of Neue 
Sachlichkeit to precision, objectivity, and veracity.7 Where Neue Sachlichkeit broadly 
advanced an aesthetics that bestowed the photograph with the status of meaningful, 
objective evidence of real-world phenomena, its critics condemned claims such as 
these as naïve realism.
Yet without muting the force of Benjamin’s and Brecht’s criticisms, I would never-
theless like to suggest that their objections are not of necessity directed specifically at 
Renger-Patzsch: Indeed, with a shift or two of rhetorical emphasis, the photographer’s 
work could have been the object especially of Benjamin’s praise, as was Renger-
Patzsch’s colleague Karl Blossfeldt. It should be clear from the start that neither side 
upheld an aesthetics centered primarily on the category of the beautiful, as did the 
pictorialists8: Like Benjamin and Brecht, Renger-Patzsch was interested in the ways 
that photography could train a new kind of perception. Neither was he invested in 
upholding inherited ideas of art or beauty, and indeed, he explicitly bracketed out 
the question of whether photography could be considered art.9 Nevertheless, Renger-
Patzsch came to serve as a necessary placeholder of sorts, a provocation and an aid 
to navigating the ambivalence of the photographic medium. In this vein, it is perhaps 
not too much of a stretch to say that if Renger-Patzsch hadn’t existed, it would have 
been necessary for Benjamin and Brecht to invent him. Thus—inversely—another 
look at the indirect debate on photography amongst Benjamin, Brecht, and Renger-
Patzsch might provide the leverage needed to pry open the ambiguities in Benjamin’s 
and Brecht’s own conceptualizations of the medium. 
At issue is not just a disagreement on the ins and outs of photographic represen-
tation, but competing paradigms of the relationship between surface appearance 
and reality and, by extension, divergent discourses on technology. The photograph 
became, in the media-theoretical discussions of the Weimar period, an arena for 
working through questions of the adequate representation and meaningful knowledge 
of reality, well beyond more modest questions of visual resemblance or verisimilitude. 
Photography was able to serve as the flashpoint for social and aesthetic debates about 
technology, representation, and knowledge largely because of larger questions con-
cerning Neue Sachlichkeit.10 Neue Sachlichkeit provided a framework for thinking 
about photographic realism, yet no clear way for unambiguously determining what 
this realism might or should entail. In part then, the differences between Benjamin’s, 
Brecht’s, and Renger-Patzsch’s views of photography stemmed from their divergent 
understandings of aesthetic realism, and what exactly might be involved in represent-
ing reality.
Renger-Patzsch’s 1928 photobook, Die Welt ist schön, is a collection of one 
hundred black and white images, each presented in numbered sequence without 
caption on a single recto page of the volume, facing a blank verso page. A table of 
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contents identifies each image concisely, naming the depicted object or landscape 
and only rarely giving geographic information. While Carl Georg Heise’s introduction 
organizes the book into eight thematic sections (“Plants,” “Animals and People,” 
“Landscape,” “Material,” “Architecture,” “Technology,” “Colorful World,” and 
“Symbol”), the collection proceeds by formal rhyming and visual analogy as much 
as it moves thematically from one image to the next.11 Through careful composition 
and lighting Renger-Patzsch is able to isolate striking formal aspects and visual details 
of such diverse subjects as agave, sheep, coffee beans, human faces, the rooftops of 
Lübeck, industrial forges, gear belts, sludge tanks, and much else. This encyclopedic 
inclusiveness, isolating disparate objects from their contexts and uniting them all, 
without explicit commentary, as objects of aesthetic appreciation under the title “Die 
Welt ist schön,” earned Renger-Patzsch the accusation of Verklärung, or aesthetic 
transfiguration.
Brecht refers to Renger-Patzsch in a 1928 fragment called “Über Fotografie” (On 
Photography). Criticizing photography’s unwillingness to move beyond displays of 
technical proficiency and attempts to mimic painting, he charges avant-garde pho-
tography with an obsessive and fetishistic focus on visual appearance: “Often, such 
a naïve question emerges from the pictures of the avant-garde: ‘Do you know what a 
woman’s bottom looks like, no, I mean what it really looks like?’”12 Yet the obsession 
with the visual is not Brecht’s primary gripe with the photography of the avant-garde 
or of Neues Sehen, but rather the suspicion that it is a disingenuous obsession, in 
that its true object is not a renewed confrontation with visual appearance at all, but 
rather a roundabout preservation of an aestheticist conception of art. “That alone 
wouldn’t be off-putting,” continues Brecht, “if one didn’t have the impression that 
they aren’t even that interested in the answer to this modest question but rather in 
the fact that an art work arises, something that uses this bottom as a mere occasion. 
The main point is probably to show that ‘life is indeed beautiful’” (“Es handelt sich 
hauptsächlich wohl darum, zu zeigen, daß ‘das Leben doch schön ist’”).
Brecht’s rendering of Renger-Patzsch’s title is telling, and it is tempting to say that 
Brecht has transfigured the title of the photobook into what he sees as its essential 
enunciatory force: where “Welt” might be taken in a more neutral sense as referring 
to the world of possible images, “Leben” suggests a glib judgment on social actuality, 
reinforced by the way the “doch,” in foregrounding the question of beauty, serves as 
the programmatic gesture of Verklärung. In a 1930 fragment, Brecht elaborates on 
the connection between photographic reproduction and Verklärung, echoing the first 
epigraph above: “Photography is the possibility of a reproduction [“Wiedergabe”] that 
plasters over the context. The Marxist [Fritz] Sternberg . . . explicates that no insights 
can be won from a (precise) photograph of a Ford factory.”13
Photography by its very medial nature has the possibility to extract visual data from 
a given social and historical context and present it in isolation, as a static, supratem-
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poral image; for Brecht and Benjamin, the contemporary tendency represented by 
Renger-Patzsch makes this moment central. Benjamin:
The World is Beautiful—this is the title of the well-known picture anthology by 
Renger-Patzsch, in which we see New Objective photography at its peak. For it has 
succeeded in transforming even abject poverty—by apprehending it in a fashionably 
perfected manner—into an object of enjoyment. For if it is an economic function 
of photography to restore to mass consumption, by fashionable adaptation, subjects 
that had earlier withdrawn themselves from it (springtime, famous people, foreign 
countries), it is one of its political functions to renew from within—that is, fashion-
ably—the world as it is.14
Thus it is not simply that photography removes the photographed object from its 
historical context, thereby obscuring this context; for Benjamin, it has the additional 
function of repackaging existing reality (“the world as it is”) in modish luster, turning 
the photographed object into an object of consumer pleasure. That which exists is 
sold, with photography’s help, as something new. This is, of course, the logic of the 
advertisement, and Benjamin had linked photography, fashion, and advertising in 
his earlier “Kleine Geschichte der Photographie,” where his target is likewise Albert 
Renger-Patzsch: “But because the true face of this kind of photographic creativity is 
the advertisement or association, its logical counterpart is the act of unmasking or 
construction.”15 To be sure, many of the images in Die Welt ist schön were produced 
for industrial and commercial clients, and the relatively new medium of advertise-
ments illustrated by photographs certainly informed contemporary discourse on 
photography.16 Yet even if we bracket out the question of advertising and the ready 
judgments on consumer culture that may accompany it, it is clear that for Benjamin 
and Brecht the photographic surface itself obscures an underlying reality rather than 
providing access to it, as it supposedly does for Renger-Patzsch.
It is therefore worth mentioning that Benjamin’s argument that the economic 
role of photography is to offer the consumer images of commodities not actually 
attainable presages John Berger’s claim in Ways of Seeing (1973) about the historical 
affinity between the rise of European oil painting and that of commodity capitalism.17 
Indeed, the commodity is an important if never fully visible term in Benjamin’s and 
Brecht’s critiques, and the charge that the image obscures rather than reveals a 
functional reality bears strong similarities to a basic Marxian dynamic: the relation-
ship between surface appearance and underlying reality, perhaps most well known 
from the discussion of commodity fetishism in volume 1 of Capital. The commodity 
is a fetish, for Marx, because it obscures the social relations that produced it; it is 
the tangible evidence of a complex, particularly historical system, and yet it seems 
to be merely an object. In Marx’s formulation, “It is nothing but the definite social 
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relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form 
of a relation between things.”18
So the problem for Benjamin and Brecht is not just that photography can make 
the ugly beautiful nor even that it transmutes social or political concerns into 
aesthetic ones, but rather that, in so doing, it recapitulates an essential logic of 
capitalist modernity. If reification or Verdinglichung obfuscates the complex social 
relations of production behind the deceptive self-evidence of a world of commodi-
ties, Verklärung obstructs access to functional social realities by presenting a world 
of things made beautiful. In this context, Verklärung for Benjamin and Brecht is not 
the necessary transfiguration of real-world material into a presentation suitable for 
an aesthetic medium, but is rather the obscuring aestheticization of complex social 
realities, performing on the level of images what Verdinglichung achieves on the 
level of things.19 Thus the problem with Renger-Patzsch’s photography for them is 
not just that it makes commodities beautiful, but that it duplicates the logic of the 
commodity fetish itself. In Brecht’s Dreigroschenprozeß, we read: “The situation thus 
becomes so complicated that a simple ‘reproduction of reality’ is now less than ever 
able to say anything about reality. A photograph of the Krupp works or the AEG shows 
almost nothing about these institutions. Actual reality has slipped into the functional 
dimension. The reification of human relations, such as the factory, for example, no 
longer surrenders the latter.”20 Closely related to the accusations of Verklärung is 
the idea that the photographic image obscures the underlying reality. Contrary to a 
logic of physiognomy, which holds that visible form is an expression of a deeper truth 
of being, the surface tells us nothing about the interior, and the image is helplessly 
mute. A reproduction of visual appearance is just that—a doubling of visual appear-
ance that offers no new insight into an already mystified and mystifying social order. 
For Benjamin, the photographic tendency represented by Renger-Patzsch senselessly 
reduplicates the world of commodities, thereby obscuring any possibility for a deeper 
recognition of the human context behind those commodities: “In it [i.e., in the motto 
“Die Welt ist schön”] is unmasked the posture of a photography that can endow any 
soup can with cosmic significance but cannot grasp a single one of the human con-
nections in which it exists, even when this photography’s most dream-laden subjects 
are a forerunner more of its salability than of any knowledge it might produce.”21 The 
photographic image thus recapitulates a logic of commodification on multiple levels.
For Brecht and Benjamin, then, Renger-Patzsch is both symptomatic and symbolic 
of photography’s innate capacity for Verklärung—in its essentially myopic focus on 
yielding up an aesthetically pleasing visual surface, it both distracts from and obstructs 
meaningful insight into the photographed object. In retrospect, it seems inevitable 
that Renger-Patzsch should have come to play this role. Die Welt ist schön was a well-
known work,22 and had its popularity, glossy images, and implicit unifying narrative 
not sufficed to earn it a representative status in late Weimar debates of photographic 
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representation, the programmatic title alone may have been enough to guarantee it 
that role. Yet as has often been pointed out, “Die Welt ist schön” was not Renger-
Patzsch’s choice of title, but that of his publisher, Kurt Wolff. The photographer’s 
own preferred title for his book was allegedly “Die Dinge”—one might imagine, all 
other things being equal, that such a title would have been far more sympathetic 
to Benjamin and Brecht than the more saccharine moniker that ended up gracing 
the collection’s cloth spine. It would be tempting to explain away their criticisms of 
Renger-Patzsch as the result of a misunderstanding, but this would be inadequate. 
Renger-Patzsch’s book, once in circulation under its more marketable, innocently 
provocative title, was no longer a collection of technically superb photographic studies 
of various objects, but itself an object, participant, and prompt in the contemporary 
discourse on the photographic medium. 
And regardless of whether it had been dubbed “Die Welt ist schön,” “Die Dinge,” 
or anything else, the photographic practice it demonstrated represented an irritation 
for a critical photographic theory. Brechtian-Benjaminian hackles would have been 
raised, I propose, whatever the title of Renger-Patzsch’s photobook. This is not because 
his photography was simply incommensurable with their views of the medium’s 
potential—I don’t think that it was—but because of a fundamental ambivalence 
within contemporary photographic discourse between what we might provisionally 
dub its formal/pedagogical and its documentary/realist emphases. Both bear upon the 
question of photography’s relationship to technology: on the one hand, the program 
of Neues Sehen foregrounded the medium’s capacity to expand and train human 
perception in a way that fit with the rapid social and technological changes of the 
period. Photography, like film, was lauded as a medium that was up to the task of 
refunctioning human sight in an age of radical industrialization and urbanization. On 
the other hand, photography’s putative mechanical exactitude inspired a whole body 
of claims and counterclaims about the camera’s superior representative potential. The 
tension between these poles has its counterparts in Benjamin and Brecht, but before 
addressing the ambivalence between photography’s various facets in their work, it 
will be useful to turn to the theoretic writings of Renger-Patzsch.
To be sure, Renger-Patzsch was interested in photography’s ability to reproduce 
(“wiedergeben”) a visual scene. But his understanding of what exactly constituted 
a photographic Wiedergabe differed from the simply positivistic notion implied by 
Brecht’s critique in the Dreigroschenprozeß, as did his conception of what photography 
could and should portray. For Renger-Patzsch, the photographic image was neither 
merely an immediate reproduction of a visual impression, nor did photography aspire 
towards enunciatory force concerning functional social realities. Just as he bracketed 
art out of photography’s purview on the one side, he denied it access to discursive or 
conceptual claims on the other: “With the attempt to represent an idea, photography 
transgresses the borders marked out for it,” as he writes in a 1961 essay called “Über 
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die Grenzen unseres Metiers. Kann die Fotografie einen Typus wiedergeben?”23 In 
this sense, Renger-Patzsch and Benjamin and Brecht are talking past each other; 
since they disagreed on the very premises of what photography was and what it should 
be, they lacked the common ground upon which to work out how it could achieve 
its aims. In a sense, this is simply another way of stating the obvious—that Benjamin 
and Brecht approached photography as critical media theorists while Renger-Patzsch 
spoke as a Berufsfotograf. Nonetheless, what is interesting is the way that both camps 
came up against the same ambivalences of the medium, each working in his own 
specific idiom.
Straight theoretical pronouncements from Renger-Patzsch are few and far 
between. The casual reader of Die Freude am Gegenstand, a recent collection of 
Renger-Patzsch’s writings on photography, will immediately notice the prevalence 
of purely technical insights. Many of Renger-Patzsch’s pieces were written for other 
photographers, and often directed towards enthusiastic amateurs seeking to hone 
their landscape or botanical photography skills. There are a few pieces that enter 
the discursive fray and address photography as a medium, such as “Ketzergedanken 
über künstlerische Photographie,” “Photographie und Kunst,” and “Ziele.” Yet even 
in the more technical texts it is possible to discern an implicit engagement with the 
questions being posed of and by the medium during the 1920s.
Photography indeed served a documentary purpose for Renger-Patzsch, but it was 
to document not simply reality at large, but rather forms per se. The Wiedergabe at 
stake was a reproduction of visual forms and, by way of these, sensory experience. 
As Claus Pfingsten has noted, “This claim of photography’s to a documentation of 
reality is realized by the photographer by taking inventory of and exactly reproduc-
ing forms.”24 Yet as Bernd Stiegler has pointed out, even within the claim to exactly 
reproduce forms—what has often been called Renger-Patzsch’s realism—there lies 
a tension between the exact depiction of an object and formal play for its own sake, 
between identification and resemblance or visual analogy.25 Because Renger-Patzsch 
was not photographing with an eye towards the identification of an object or scene 
but rather to draw out salient formal features, his more technical writings emphasize 
the initial composition of an image and its subsequent cropping in the darkroom. 
Thus to take an example emphasized by Thomas Janzen, an image that depicts an 
immediately recognizable quay wall above a canal is cropped to become the diagonal 
intersection of two surfaces—the stipple of brick and the ripple of water.26 In Stiegler’s 
formulation, “scarcely any photographer of his time so fully committed himself to the 
world of things as he, yet also hardly any carried formal abstraction as far as he did.”27
The tendency towards formal play distances the photograph from any simple iden-
tificatory function that might be anticipated by the idea of Wiedergabe, and enables 
the photographed subjects to mingle more freely; natural and technological forms, for 
example, come to resemble one another.28 A close-up of a snake’s scales produces the 
 Carl Gelderloos 557
formal repetition and burnished hardness of a machine, while images of industrial 
forges or warehouses take on an organic, creaturely quality. As Bernd Stiegler writes, 
His concept, which as he understands it ties art and handicraft, nature and 
culture, subject and object, technology and flora to each other, is form. Form is 
in his photographic theory and praxis the central mediating instance that should 
serve to neutralize the ambivalence of his images and texts. It should allow him 
to associate radical modernity and “elementary spaces.” Photography is for him 
the characteristic and particular encounter of the concrete object with abstract 
form—and vice-versa, the abstract object with the concrete form.29
Formal principles allow Die Welt ist schön to move between images of otherwise 
incongruous subjects, from the North Sea surf, for example, to rows of identical cob-
bler’s lasts, and form for Renger-Patzsch is closely linked to photography’s capacity 
for Wiedergabe—the well-chosen form is what brings the essence of the photographed 
object to the viewer.
Yet for Renger-Patzsch, Wiedergabe is not merely a visual duplication of what 
exists, but is rather the recreation of a perceptual experience for the viewer; likewise, 
the essence (“das Wesentliche”) is not conceived as a conceptual or critical knowl-
edge of the object (Brecht’s factory, say) but is instead supposed to be a representa-
tive moment that makes a particular quality of the photographed subject present 
for the viewer. In a programmatic essay called “Ziele,” Renger-Patzsch speaks in 
favor of a kind of photographic realism that would be able to reproduce impressions 
(“Eindrücke”) and the “magic of the material” (“den Zauber des Materials”).30 The 
mechanical nature of photography means that it is the medium able to “do justice” 
to modern technology: “To do justice in the image to the rigid linear structure of 
modern technology, the airy latticework of cranes and bridges, the dynamics of 
1,000- horsepower machines is likely something only photography can do.”31 Expand-
ing upon this idea in “Photographie und Kunst,” he writes:
Thus [the photographer] can in the blink of an eye conjure forth things with which 
the artist would have to struggle for days on end; not to speak of those areas that 
are closed to the artist, but in which photography finds itself most at home. Be it 
as a sovereign ruler of the most fleeting moments or in the analysis of individual 
phases of quick movement, be it to fix the all too quickly fading formal beauty of 
flowers or to reproduce the dynamism in the realm of modern technology.32
The particular temporality involved in both “fixing” an evanescent moment in 
a biological process and reproducing technological dynamism is worth noting here; 
both punctual and sustained, it elicits an elemental dimension common to organic 
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life and technological modernity alike. Likewise, the sensory experience that is the 
goal of Renger-Patzsch’s Wiedergabe is the experience of space, motion, and kinetic 
potential: “One still asks what the tasks of photography are? To capture the height of 
a Gothic cathedral so that one gets a feeling of dizziness, to capture an automobile, 
so that one sees its inherent speed, to capture the air, so that one feels the space.”33 
That Renger-Patzsch’s Wiedergabe is the recreation of kinaesthetic and sensual 
experience rather than the duplication of the visible can be seen in his advice to 
amateur photographers on how to compose a landscape. While the photographic 
novice immersed in a natural landscape such as the Harz Mountains would tend 
to photograph a given scene indiscriminately, unwittingly influenced by the various 
sense impressions—the smell of the air, the vastness of the landscape, the pleasant 
fatigue of the hike, and so on—that subtly and momentarily contribute to making 
the landscape noteworthy, the finished photograph of course conveys none of this, 
and may seem pale and bland in comparison to the original experience. By contrast 
the more experienced photographer, according to Renger-Patzsch, filters out the 
other sense impressions and carefully chooses a detail or form in the landscape 
that captures its particular quality, thus recreating the total sensory experience that 
the careless amateur, unknowingly influenced by it, actually destroys.34 “Whoever 
knows a landscape must also immediately recognize it in a photograph; whoever 
does not know it must get the correct idea of it.”35 When prescribing proper practice 
for landscape photography, Renger-Patzsch relies on the category of “Ähnlichkeit,” 
but this is no more a simple resemblance to the landscape than “Wiedergabe” is a 
duplication of the visual. Instead, “Ähnlichkeit” relies on an understanding of the 
perceived characteristic qualities of a landscape: “We must welcome everything that 
underscores the particular character; we must condemn the accidental aspects we 
encounter everywhere.”36
The photographed landscape must therefore resemble an ideal version of the 
actual landscape, a version that captures its essential qualities. Put this way, this 
photographic imperative could certainly be understood as the type of Verklärung 
criticized by Brecht and Benjamin, a smoothing over of the visible surface to make 
any subject more aesthetically appealing, extracting an “essence” cleansed of its 
historical and social context to present it as something eternal. But another reading 
of Renger-Patzsch’s landscape advice would see it as the kind of negotiation of the rela-
tionship among sense perception, formal play, and new media characteristic of other 
avant-garde discourse of the time. Discussing a key ambivalence in Renger-Patzsch’s 
theoretical writings between photography’s documentary and essentialist aspirations, 
Stiegler writes, “a photography [conceived] as documentation opposes one [conceived] 
as gazing upon an essence.”37 This is an important point, and the two tendencies do 
exist side by side in Renger-Patzsch’s writings without being fully resolved, but one 
must go further. I would suggest that the tension between documentation and essence 
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cannot be fully resolved in Renger-Patzsch’s work because they are arguably never 
entirely distinct from one another. Photographic Wiedergabe is the documentation of 
an essence. As the advice on composing a landscape suggests, to accurately render the 
formal and surface qualities of an object is to reproduce “das Wesentliche,” and this 
type of photography, both “Dokumentation” and “Wesensschau,” is also a training of 
visual perception. In other words, to teach the viewer to see the “essential,” so little 
evident in a given photogenic object or scene that the amateur photographer may 
miss it entirely, is tantamount to training a new sort of perception. 
A just recreation of a landscape, a botanical specimen, or a modern machine 
necessitates a new kind of perception that, in foregrounding salient formal features, 
breaks with the encrusted habits of an inherited aesthetics that takes its cues from 
painting. In this regard, Renger-Patzsch’s photographic program shared key impe-
tuses with that of László Moholy-Nagy, although his aesthetic strategy and practice 
were quite different.38 Like Moholy-Nagy’s 1925 Malerei Fotografie Film, Die Welt 
ist schön was understood by its author as an “ABC-Buch,” a photographic primer 
intended to train a heightened formal awareness, sharpening the eye to grant it both 
a renewed perception of natural forms and aesthetic access to modern technology, a 
point emphasized by Heise in his introduction to the volume.39
I have, I hope, sufficiently problematized the self-evidence of certain positions 
and presuppositions in Renger-Patzsch’s photographic practice and theory that we 
may return to Benjamin’s and Brecht’s criticisms. Without wishing to reconcile the 
various complex positions with one another without remainder, it nonetheless seems 
safe to say that Renger-Patzsch’s photographic project was not the glibly aestheticiz-
ing replication of surface appearance that their writings seem to imply, but is rather 
part of a contemporary discourse on perception, technology, and modernity invested 
in rethinking the possibilities of the photographic medium in opposition to what 
were seen as inherited, traditionalist, and still culturally dominant aesthetic norms. 
“Wiedergabe,” a term as central to Renger-Patzsch’s work as it is odious to Brecht, 
proves to be a dense concept that is arguably compatible not only with an avant-garde 
program of Neues Sehen but also with the very compositional principles of construc-
tion and dismantling that were key in Brecht and Benjamin’s conception of what 
photography should be. Given the emphasis in Brecht’s work, from epic theater to the 
Dreigroschenprozeß, on making social realities visible,40 or Benjamin’s praise of the 
camera’s ability to discover hitherto hidden worlds,41 it becomes somewhat surprising 
that they would react so vehemently to a photographer who also thought of his work 
as perceptual training.
Even the accusation that Renger-Patzsch’s photography homogenizes everything it 
depicts under the rubric of aestheticization, thus eclipsing the social, historical, and 
economic contexts, becomes less damning when one considers that Benjamin praised 
another photographer precisely for the way his visual innovations blended natural 
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and technological forms. In “Neues von Blumen,” a 1928 review of Karl Blossfeldt’s 
book Urformen der Kunst, Benjamin lauds Blossfeldt’s detailed photographic studies 
of botanical forms for expanding the contemporary “perceptual inventory” (“Wahr-
nehmungsinventar”).42 This is striking in light of Benjamin’s scornful dismissals of 
Renger-Patzsch’s work, not least because Renger-Patzsch conceived of his own work 
in similar terms. Benjamin’s review continues, in terms that could be applied nearly 
unaltered to Renger-Patzsch’s work: 
Whether we speed up the growth of a plant with time-lapse or show its form 
magnified forty times—in both cases a geyser of new image worlds hisses up from 
sites of existence from which we least expected it. These photographs reveal a 
totally unsuspected treasure of analogies and forms in the existence of plants. Only 
photography is capable of this.43
While it might be argued that use of the camera’s ability to magnify is what con-
stitutes the difference for Benjamin between Blossfeldt and Renger-Patzsch, since 
the former’s plant photography relied more upon larger-than-life depictions than the 
latter’s, such stylistic details in photographic praxis hardly seem able to account for 
Benjamin’s dichotomous characterization of the two photographers, especially since 
Renger-Patzsch’s photographic theory and practice, with its emphasis on formal 
analogy and perceptual training, coincided so neatly with precisely those aspects that 
Benjamin praised in Blossfeldt’s work. Even the tropes Benjamin uses to describe the 
new access photography gives to the forms of the plant kingdom rhyme with Renger-
Patzsch’s own depiction. Where Benjamin writes of Blossfeldt’s photographs that 
“Gazing at them, we stroll beneath these giant plants like Liliputians. To draw all the 
sweetness from these calyxes/chalices is reserved for great fraternal spirits, sunlike 
eyes like those possessed by Goethe and Herder,”44 Renger-Patzsch encourages those 
photographing flowers to see with the eyes of insects: “What is appealing is that, when 
photographing, one is forced to adjust one’s eye to the more or less small organism 
that a blossom represents, that one is forced, so to speak, to see with the eye of an 
insect and to make their world our own.”45 
Furthermore, the discovery of artificial forms in natural phenomena that Benjamin 
sees in Blossfeldt’s images could be seen as the very program of Die Welt ist schön. The 
most obvious counterpart to Benjamin’s description of this tendency46 is perhaps the 
stylized depiction of an agave plant and a telegraph mast above the monogram on the 
cover of Die Welt ist schön. Representative of the book’s aesthetic program of catalog-
ing visual forms from various realms usually considered distinct, the juxtaposition of 
agave and telegraph mast is, as Bernd Stiegler points out, by a surprising coincidence 
replicated in Benjamin’s short narrative from 1930, “ Myslowitz—Braunschweig—
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Marseilles. Die Geschichte eines Haschischrausches.” Based on a September, 1928 
hashish protocol, the text describes a “close combat between telegraph poles and 
agaves, barbed wire and spiny palm trees” to characterize the “major decisive battle 
between city and country.”47 
Both resemblance and antagonism, substitution and equivalence, the relationship 
between the agave and the telegraph masts signals a particular discursive configura-
tion of Weimar culture, a discourse in which nature, technology, perception, and 
modernity were semantically and conceptually reconstituting and being reconstituted 
by each other, with no term functioning as a stable or independent variable. In its 
emphasis on formal play and perceptual training, Die Welt ist schön was no less radical 
a contribution to this discourse than Benjamin’s and Brecht’s critiques of it. So what 
accounts for the vehemence of their dismissals?
I suggested earlier that Renger-Patzsch served as a foil for Benjamin and Brecht, 
allowing them to work out their own photographic theories, although perhaps “straw 
man” would be the apter term. Die Welt ist schön could then stand in for the perceived 
tendency of contemporary photography to conflate unaltered surface appearance with 
deep structural insight, offering up whatever it photographs in a homogenous and 
blandly affirmative aestheticization. It should be noted that Benjamin and Brecht 
were not simply measuring contemporary photographic praxis against the abstract 
and absolute mandate that it yield immediate insights, and necessarily finding that 
it fell short, but were rather responding to a prevailing view of photography that 
attributed to the camera a more immediate access to reality than other media were 
capable of. Photography’s indexicality—the way that the camera produced a record of 
a given configuration of light in a given place at a given time—granted it in the eyes of 
many a claim to documentary veracity. In this light, Benjamin and Brecht were each 
attempting to theorize how photography might regain some of its inherent potential for 
disruption, against what they saw as the shortcomings of contemporary photographic 
praxis and theory.48 Their strong critiques of Renger-Patzsch and the photography 
of Neue Sachlichkeit more generally demonstrate a discursive constellation within 
Weimar discourse consisting of a renewed urgency of the visual, a heightened sense 
of the political, social, and technological stakes of late capitalism (including the rising 
threat of fascism), and a rethinking of technology, both as an aesthetic object and 
as the technological means of aesthetic production that Brecht called the Apparat.
One could speculate that part of the reason for the urgency of the question of 
photography is that, in the 1920s, the moment of aesthetic production increasingly 
involved machines on both sides of the equation. As the photographers of New 
Objectivity flocked to the industrial zones of the Ruhrgebiet and cameras and loco-
motives found themselves facing one another, older notions of both the artist and 
artistic material became ever more apparently inadequate.49 Just before Brecht’s 
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criticism in the Dreigroschenprozeß of photographs of factories, he states that it is 
more important for a filmmaker to understand his technological apparatus than to 
aspire to produce “art.”
Only in this way can a particular director achieve his “art” in the face of the new 
apparatuses under the helpful pressure of the sales department: what he achieves 
is what he himself can make according to his philistine understanding of art. What 
art should do is something he won’t know. . . . In the domain of art he exerts the 
understanding of an oyster, and in the domain of technology it is no better. He is 
able to comprehend nothing of the apparatuses: he rapes them with his “art.” . . . 
As if one could understand something about art without understanding anything 
about reality! And here, the apparatus serves as reality at the same time as the 
subject matter does.50
For Brecht, then, reality cannot be understood without an understanding of tech-
nology, and crucially, this includes the possibilities of the camera. Far from being 
exhausted by a reproduction of visual appearance, the camera for Brecht is an 
instrument of dismantling and construction. Further on in the Dreigroschenprozeß, 
he writes of the technological progress demonstrated by specific improvements to 
cameras and film, including increased sensitivity to light and other innovations that 
facilitate in photographing faces:
But the images one can thus produce are undoubtedly much worse. With the 
old, less light-sensitive apparatuses, multiple expressions appeared on the plate, 
which had to be exposed for a fairly long time; in this way, the finite image had 
a more universal and living expression, and also something of function. . . . The 
new apparatuses no longer integrate faces—but do they need to be integrated? 
Perhaps there is a way of photographing, possible for the newer apparatuses, that 
dissects faces?51
The suggestion of a photography that dismantles and analyzes rather than composes 
is also contained in a short fragment called “Fotografie,” probably from 1928, in 
which Brecht proposes a series of “essential portraits” created by the juxtaposition 
of multiple images: “A head, captured on different days, in different years. The dif-
ferences to be brought out. Study of the approximations of physiognomies. A certain 
number of faces of men and women. Who is married to whom? (One selects those 
married a long time.)”52 The fragment continues by proposing “functional portraits” 
of hands—the hands of manual and intellectual laborers each holding the tools of 
their own trade, and then the tools of each other’s trade.
The analytic, dismantling approach to portraiture is reminiscent of Brecht’s sus-
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tained critique of bourgeois individuality, whether in the Dreigroschenroman or Mann 
ist Mann. Echoing the thematic focus in these texts on disassembling and demontage 
is a program of artistic representation predicated not on reflection but on construction 
and analysis. “The reification of human relations, such as the factory, for example, no 
longer yields up the latter. So there is indeed ‘something to be constructed,’ some-
thing ‘artificial,’ ‘contrived.’ By the same token, art is necessary.”53 The artifice of a 
series of juxtaposed portraits assembled in an experimental vein might thus be able 
to access levels of social reality that a simple “Wiedergabe” cannot; the implication is 
that, for Brecht, portraits of hands may well be able to tell us things about capitalist 
labor where the picture of the factory remains mute. Benjamin likewise emphasizes 
the constructionist aspect in photography: “But because the true face of this kind of 
photographic creativity is the advertisement or association, its logical counterpart is 
the act of unmasking or construction.”54
Yet the sudden introduction of “Entlarvung,” unmasking, complicates things. 
What is the relationship between unmasking and revealing on the one hand, and 
construction, artifice, analysis, and dismantling on the other? “Unmasking or 
construction”—does the “or” mark an apposition or a choice between alternatives? 
Where Brecht’s suggestions for a serial, analytic portraiture imply the centrality of a 
functional relation, “Entlarvung” suggests at first glance a more immediate and visual 
access to reality. And if photographic practice is faulted for producing a fetishization 
of surfaces, what might it mean, concretely, to unmask it, taking the surface off of a 
surface? While the possibilities of the technological Apparat seen by Brecht and Ben-
jamin in Konstruktion and Zerlegung may well be compatible with Renger-Patzsch’s 
formal play and perceptual training, Entlarvung is an aspect that cannot so easily be 
meshed with his work, his emphasis on das Wesentliche notwithstanding. If it is still 
broadly true that, for Renger-Patzsch the visible surface grants access to reality while 
for Benjamin and Brecht the surface obscures reality, nevertheless the terms have 
shifted somewhat. The reality accessed by the visible in Renger-Patzsch’s work is not 
an underlying, deep reality but rather an interplay of visual forms able to recreate a 
sensual, perceptual experience; by contrast, Benjamin and Brecht are now the ones 
who imply that photography, beyond its contemporary, flawed practice, might yield 
insights into a deeper functional or structural reality.
Furthermore, what might intuitively seem like contradictory tendencies within 
each theorist’s work are perhaps better described as foundational tensions. On the 
one hand, Renger-Patzsch’s “Wiedergabe” is not a strictly documentary impulse that 
contrasts with the more avant-garde emphasis on perceptual training but is rather, 
with its focus on compositional selection and formal interplay, the very vehicle for 
this training. And in the case of Benjamin and Brecht, Konstruktion, Zerlegung, and 
Entlarvung are, of course, not in a contradictory relationship either. Brecht’s fragment 
on serial portraiture suggests that dismantling and construction are in fact methods 
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for photography to be able to reveal something about reality; the camera for Brecht 
should be an irritant, and the thrust of his photographic theory was to rethink how the 
Apparat could break through the glossy veneer spread by a profusion of images and 
a facilely mimetic photographic practice.55 For Benjamin, Entlarvung is not simply 
unmasking, but is related to a practice of satire and quotation that confronts ideology 
with its own premises by means of strategic juxtaposition.
Yet while these different photographic possibilities support one another, they still 
cannot be fully reconciled. Benjamin’s praise of the way that Blossfeldt’s category 
of plant forms adds to our Wahrnehmungsinventar cannot comfortably be squared 
with his accusations of Renger-Patzsch’s Verklärung, nor is it apparent that Brecht’s 
proposed essential and functional portraits would actually offer the insight he suggests, 
given his claim that “anyone who only gives the experienceable side of reality does not 
reproduce reality itself.”56 What may ultimately be at issue here is the same tension 
between the formal and documentary aspects of the photographic image that makes 
Renger-Patzsch’s “einfache Wiedergabe der Realität” not simply a reproduction of 
reality. At the same time that Benjamin and Brecht rely upon photography’s ability 
to depict visual forms, they also implicitly demand that it be able to make discursive 
statements about reality. 
Significantly, Benjamin and Brecht both suggest Beschriftung, or captioning, as 
a way out of the impasse of photographic signification, and it is the strategy Brecht 
will ultimately use in his wartime Kriegsfibel, his most sustained contribution as a 
photographic practitioner.57 The written word is to offer both the clarity and the inter-
ruption not, or no longer, accessible to the photographic image alone. Yet inversely, 
the two theorists draw upon the visual to describe projects in other media. As Steve 
Giles has pointed out, Brecht uses “abziehen,” a verb used to describe the process of 
printing an image from a photographic negative, to characterize his method in the 
Dreigroschenprozeß of bringing bourgeois ideology to light.58 And in the same passage 
he denies revelatory force to a photograph of the factory, Brecht uses “fixieren,” which 
in German as in English can refer to the process of chemically fixing an image on 
a photosensitive medium, to describe how the new apparatuses (i.e., the camera) 
could have learned something from the natural sciences about depicting human 
behavior: “to fix the reciprocal behavior of humans.”59 So at the same time that the 
visual image is deemed inadequate to convey discursive meaning, the revelatory or 
demonstrative function of a text has to draw upon a register of the visual: Put bluntly, 
the text is to show, make visible, and fix, while the actual image alone seems able to 
do none of these.
This ambivalence towards the signifying capability of the visual can be situated 
within the larger context of the contemporary resurgence of physiognomic discourse. 
Where the camera’s mechanical exactitude generated a host of claims about its access 
to indexical truth, physiognomy linked visual appearance to an underlying reality. As 
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argued by Sabine Hake and Matthias Uecker, the Weimar-era photobook often relied 
upon a physiognomic discourse whereby their photographic subjects were supposed to 
speak clearly about themselves through the image alone, and yet this project repeat-
edly ran into the dilemma that the intended unambiguous pronouncement—about an 
individual, a type, a social group, a historical or political narrative—found itself tripped 
up by the ambiguous muteness of the image, the slippery relationship between type 
and mass, or the instability of the very social consensus that originally guaranteed the 
physiognomic legibility of images.60 The visual surface of things that for physiognomy 
reveals their inner contours remained, frustratingly at times, just a surface. While 
Brecht and Benjamin responded to this context by rethinking the surface, challenging 
its putative naturalness by pointing out and recreating its essential constructedness, 
Renger-Patzsch engaged in the process of exploring the imagistic surface by means 
of formal analogy, in order to challenge aesthetic and perceptual norms.
Renger-Patzsch’s photographic practice and particularly the emphasis in Die Welt 
ist schön on a formal movement across images from disparate realms both demon-
strates the type of perceptual training I have outlined above and undermines the 
presumption of a static identity between image and reality implicit in the accusation.61 
In various sequences of Die Welt ist schön, formal elements encourage the viewer 
to look for forms as such, thereby disrupting the containment within the frame of a 
single image that would seem to be necessary for the facile aesthetic “reproduction 
of reality” variously alleged by Benjamin and Brecht. While one can certainly argue 
that it is precisely this connection across images that enables the uncritical leveling of 
the visible world in the service of a repressive harmony, Renger-Patzsch’s theoretical 
writings suggest to the contrary (and at times despite themselves) that these image 
sequences undermine rather than reinforce the apparent self-evidence of the world 
of things. 
A low-angle photograph of the nave of the St. Katharinenkirche in Lübeck (Fig-
ure 2), for example, echoes the vaulted arches, serial repetition, and inverted triangle 
of an array of industrial irons (Figure 1), while the light reflecting off a carefully 
arranged group at the forefront of the latter suggests the chiaroscuro of ecclesiastical 
space. On the whole the irons are cleaner, lighter, and more neatly arranged, but 
the photograph of the church is exposed in a way that both recalls the serial forms 
of the irons and resembles the bright open spaces of modern design. This formal 
rhyming, which links the timelessness of a sacred space and the modular, regimented 
production time of industrial modernity, continues in the next two images, with a 
prominent diagonal originating in the lower right of the frame and a reconfiguration 
of similar oblique curves connecting palace steps to the sparse design of a modern 
ceiling. A similar movement from sacred to profane by means of a shared form can be 
seen in images 62 to 64, for example, where a gentle baroque curve is stretched and 
minimalized in the modernist contour of the Fagus factory in Alfeld. To take another 
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example, the struts and supports of an empty Ferris wheel (Figure 5) recall the lines 
and lattices of a preceding series of images of industrial equipment (Plate 78, and 
Figures 3 and 4), a point reinforced by the alienating framing and abandoned impres-
sion of the ferris wheel. An immediate association provoked by the visual similarity of 
these machines at rest is the fundamental indistinction between machines that move 
material for production and those that move people for amusement. This association 
carries over to the following image of a merry-go-round, where the close cropping, 
the prevalence of dark tones, and the stony folds of a lowering curtain add up to an 
eerie stasis rather than pleasant motion—the frozen rictus of the horses suggests the 
terror of impalement far more than the joy of galloping (Figure 6).
Where this paper began with a hypothetical image of a factory whose visible surface 
remained mute, perhaps it is fitting to end with two actual photographs of the sea, the 
guiding image for tropes of visible surface and hidden depths. The first one depicts a 
scene of rocky surf in the Kattegat, where several ships full of troops sank during the 
German invasion of Norway. It is the seventh image from Brecht’s Kriegsfibel. While 
there are no people visible in the image, Brecht’s quatrain lends voice to a collective 
speaker beneath the waves: “Eight thousand strong we lie in the [Kattegat]. / Packed 
Figure 1. “Bügeleisen für Schuhfabrikation. 
Fagus-Werk Benscheidt in Alfeld.” Albert 
Renger-Patzsch, Die Welt ist schön. Plate 93. 
© 2013 Albert Renger-Patzsch Archiv / Ann u. 
Jürgen Wilde, Zülpich / Artists Rights Society 
(ARS), New York
Figure 2. “Gewölbe des Mittelschiffs der 
St. Katharinenkirche in Lübeck.” Albert 
Renger-Patzsch, Die Welt ist schön. Plate 94. 
© 2013 Albert Renger-Patzsch Archiv / Ann u. 
Jürgen Wilde, Zülpich / Artists Rights Society 
(ARS), New York
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Figure 3. “Kranreihe im Lübecker Hafen.” 
Albert Renger-Patzsch, Die Welt ist schön. Plate 
79. © 2013 Albert Renger-Patzsch Archiv / Ann 
u. Jürgen Wilde, Zülpich / Artists Rights Society 
(ARS), New York
Figure 4. “Laufkran mit Eisenbarren im 
Hochofenwerk Herrenwyk.” Albert Renger-
Patzsch, Die Welt ist schön. Plate 80. © 2013 
Albert Renger-Patzsch Archiv / Ann u. Jürgen 
Wilde, Zülpich / Artists Rights Society (ARS), 
New York
Figure 6. “Karussel.” Albert Renger-Patzsch, 
Die Welt ist schön. Plate 82. © 2013 Albert 
Renger-Patzsch Archiv / Ann u. Jürgen Wilde, 
Zülpich / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New 
York
Figure 5. “Russische Schaukel wird montiert.” 
Albert Renger-Patzsch, Die Welt ist schön.  
Plate 81. © 2013 Albert Renger-Patzsch 
Archiv / Ann u. Jürgen Wilde, Zülpich / Artists 
Rights Society (ARS), New York
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into cattleboats we crossed the sea. / Fisherman, when fish have filled your net / 
Remember us, and let just one swim free.”62 The visible landscape is thus shown to 
be a screen that obscures the real significance of the scene: nature literally covers 
history. The other image shows surf on a beach in the neighboring North Sea, and it 
is plate 40 from Die Welt ist schön. There are no words, of course, but the following 
several images repeat visual elements from the photograph to transform the surface 
from a natural to a technological one. Plate 41 keeps the pattern of the surf but 
introduces a diagonal row of wooden pilings; this configuration becomes a rickety 
wooden walkway over water in the next image, and plate 43 takes up the vertical 
iteration of the walkway’s planks and transforms it into a forest of young beech trees. 
The multiple vertical elements are preserved in tree shots through 45, whose starkly 
contrasting pattern of wood and snow becomes a “Fir, bent by a snowstorm;” its stark 
diagonal on a light background is echoed in the banks of the Trave in 47, becomes a 
pair of rails in 48, a quay wall in 49, and the next image, reversing the diagonal and 
preserving only the repetition of forms from the brick wall, depicts rows of identical 
shoe lasts, signaling the thematic transition to a series of architectural and industrial 
images. Thus in a sense, both Brecht’s and Renger-Patzsch’s seascapes are able to 
serve as images of technological modernity; neither photograph lingers in its littoral 
isolation, but the way that they connect the image of nature to contemporary histori-
cal processes via their contrasting treatments of the visible surface says much about 
how they relate technology, nature, and the visual. Brecht’s ironic disruption of the 
surface plunges the poetic speaker beneath the waves to show that nature, and by 
extension any technological or historical constellation that may come to seem natural, 
is a constructed surface that must be teased apart by the strategies available to the 
apparatus. For Renger-Patzsch, nature and technology are so linked as elemental 
forms that they lack any categorical distinction at all; this is a paradoxical and likely 
conservative logic that obscures the particular social and historical constructedness 
of each sphere, and yet it is precisely on the formal surface that Renger-Patzsch 
locates photography’s ability to forge a perception adequate to its historical moment.
While Renger-Patzsch was consigned by Benjamin and Brecht to the dustbin of a 
naïve and retrograde aesthetic realism, a closer look at his photographic theory and 
practice shows on the contrary just how complex, vexed, and interesting that most 
simplistic of photography’s aspirations and possibilities—namely, the exact mechanical 
reproduction of the visible surface of things—can be. If photography served Renger-
Patzsch, Benjamin, and Brecht in various ways to raise the question of a modern 
aesthetics and an artistic practice adequate to social and technological modernity, 
we in turn must ask after the relationship between the modern perceptual apparatus 
that saw and depicted, on the one hand, and the modernity that was to be seen and 
depicted, on the other. The idea of technology served, in various ways and to varying 
degrees of conceptual precision, as a focal point and catalyst for these self-consciously 
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modern aesthetic and media-theoretical discussions of technologically enhanced 
vision. In this sense, the ambivalence of the demands made of the photographic 
image to document reality, train perception, and explore formal variations reflects 
deeper ambiguities embedded within the very ideas of technology and modernity. The 
modernity of photography is both the context it is tasked with documenting and the 
perceptual habits and formal discoveries it instantiates. Both preexisting the medium 
as its context and produced by it as its aesthetic legacy, “modernity” is on both sides 
of the camera and the photographic frame, and on neither side.
Notes
 An earlier version of this essay benefited greatly from the patient engagement and rigorous scrutiny 
of friends and colleagues as part of Cornell’s Institute for German Cultural Studies colloquium 
series in August, 2012. My thanks to all participants, and especially to Ari Linden and Katrina 
Nousek for their thorough feedback in the context of a later dissertation writing group. Insights, 
critiques, and suggestions, even where they could not be satisfactorily incorporated into the 
current article, have nonetheless become part of this project’s long-term zymurgy.
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